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Starbucks recently opened the 15th Ave. Coffee & Tea Com-
pany, whose outlets have none of the ordinary indicia of a Star-
bucks coffee store.
1
  As the corporate logo reproduced above 
shows, the stores note that they are ―inspired by Starbucks.‖  This 
is perhaps technically true, but in an odd and misleading way: they 
are run by Starbucks.  I say misleading because ―inspired by‖ vi-
olates the standard rules of conversational implicature, which di-
rect speakers to offer the appropriate amount of information, no 
more and no less.
2
  A Starbucks company that calls itself ―inspired 
by‖ Starbucks is not saying enough given the circumstances, any 
more than a statement that said ―Politician X had a romantic dinner 
with a man last night‖ would do so if the speaker knew that the 
man was her husband. 
Well, so what?  As Jeremy Sheff‘s presentation at this sympo-
sium suggested, withholding from consumers the information that 
the store is a Starbucks operation is not necessarily wrongful.
3 
 The 
                                                 
*  Professor, Georgetown Law. 
1  15TH AVE. COFFEE & TEA, http://www.streetlevelcoffee.com (last visited Apr. 4, 
2011). 
2  See Paul Grice, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS 24–40 (1989). 
3  See generally Jeremy N. Sheff, The Ethics of Unbranding, 21 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J 983 (2011).  
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concern I have is essentially one for fairness.  One way to talk 
about the examples of un- and re-branding that Professor Sheff 
discussed is as an example of ―heads I win, tails you lose.‖4  The 
very companies that want to use our credit and browsing histories 
to decide about how to deal with us, and who tell us that to walk 
away from an underwater mortgage is immoral regardless of 
whether the law allows abandonment,
5
 want to be able to walk 
away from their own reputations whenever that would benefit them 
by making it harder for us to figure out who they are.
6
 
Sometimes this is by rebranding.  Sometimes it is by marketing 
techniques that make it look like other people approve of the 
trademark owner.  We have different names for this—buzz market-
ing,
7 
stealth marketing,
8 
Astroturfing,
9
 and so on.  Trademark law 
probably does not have much to say about rebranding in itself.  But 
there are definitely things that could go wrong with trademark in 
terms of the balance between source identification and freedom to 
compete and to speak as a result of such practices.  And this is 
where my concern for symmetry arises. 
 
 
 
                                                 
4  See id. Part II.  
5  See Brent T. White, Underwater and Not Walking Away: Shame, Fear and the So-
cial Management of the Housing Crisis, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 971 (2010) (analyzing 
the pressures on homeowners not to engage in strategic default, by contrast to the expec-
tations that corporations will behave rationally). 
6  See E. Scott Reckard, B of A Rebranding “Toxic” Countrywide Lending Operation, 
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/apr/27/business/fi-
countrywide27 (describing the ―rebranding of nearly 1,300 Countrywide mortgage offic-
es nationwide‖). 
7  See Gerry Khermouch and Jeff Green, Buzz Marketing, BUS. WK., July 30, 2001, 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/01_31/b3743001.htm. 
8  See Jacob E. Osterhout, Stealth Marketing: When You’re Being Pitched and You 
Don’t Even Know It!, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 19, 2010, http://articles.nydailynews.com/ 
2010-04-19/entertainment/27062069_1_stealth-marketing-buzz-marketing-blackberry-
pearl. 
9  See George Monbiot, These Astroturf Libertarians are the Real Threat to Internet 
Democracy, GUARDIAN, Dec. 13, 2010, available at http://www.guardian. 
co.uk/commentisfree/libertycentral/2010/dec/13/astroturf-libertarians-internet-democracy 
?showallcomments=true#comment-fold (―An astroturf campaign is one that mimics spon-
taneous grassroots mobilisations but which has in reality been organised.‖). 
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10
 
So, ―inspired by Starbucks‖ really means owned and operated 
by Starbucks.  But compare that to the copycat colognes pictured 
below, labeled as ―inspired by Obsession,‖ ―inspired by Hugo,‖ 
and so on.  This perfume seller has no business relationship with 
any of the named perfume makers and is trying to communicate 
something very different: that its products are (cheaper) substitutes 
for the name brands, with similar smells. 
You might think that this is wrongful behavior—in Europe 
they certainly do
11—but in the United States it is generally consi-
dered legitimate comparative advertising to explain that a product 
is a copy of another product, as long as it‘s clear that the statement 
is comparative.
12
  Given that there‘s no other brand name on the 
                                                 
10  From Author‘s collection. 
11  See Directive 2006/114/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 
December 2006 Concerning Misleading and Comparative Advertising and Repealing 
Council Directive 84/450/EEC, 2006 O.J. (L 376) 23 (―Comparative advertising shall, as 
far as the comparison is concerned, be permitted when . . . it does not present goods or 
services as imitations or replicas of goods or services bearing a protected trade mark or 
trade name.‖); Case C-487/07, L‘Oreal SA v. Bellure NV, 2009 E.C.R. I-05185 (holding 
that ―an advertiser who states explicitly or implicitly in comparative advertising that the 
product marketed by him is an imitation of a product bearing a well-known trade mark‖ 
has engaged in unfair competition within the meaning of Council Directive 84/450). 
12  See August Storck K.G. v. Nabisco, Inc., 59 F.3d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1995) (―The 
FTC believes that consumers gain from comparative advertising, and to make the com-
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bottles of cologne here, and that the well-known trademarks are in 
the prominent place usually reserved for the seller‘s own mark, this 
particular instance may well be going too far to count as legitimate 
comparative advertising.  But the idea of being ―inspired by‖ is 
certainly a comparative advertising claim as conventionally un-
derstood. 
The dual use of ―inspired by‖ illustrates the larger issue: The 
more subtle the trademark owners get in their references to them-
selves, the more scope they well have to claim ownership over all 
references.  In a world of 15th Avenues ―inspired by‖ their corpo-
rate parents, even a prominent brand name of the product‘s own 
doesn‘t clearly communicate separate ownership and comparison. 
The problem gets worse when we think about things like prod-
uct placement.  Some people have argued that undisclosed product 
placement is deceptive.
13 
 I do not want to spend too much time on 
whether and how disclosure of product placement should be re-
quired because my interest here is in a particular argument often 
made by disclosure skeptics: that disclosure is unnecessary because 
reasonable consumers understand that undisclosed sponsorship 
agreements are in place all over.
14 
 As a result, the argument goes, 
a reasonable consumer should know that the person touting a dieta-
ry supplement in the comments of a blog or writing her own blog 
or newsletter may in fact be a paid shill.  A reasonable consumer 
should expect that any time she sees a car on television it appears 
as a result of a sponsorship arrangement. 
I think this idea has unappealing consequences for dynamic ef-
ficiency, among other things.  If the reasonable consumer has to 
assume that everyone else might be lying about their identity, we 
                                                                                                             
parison vivid the Commission ‗encourages the naming of, or reference to competitors.‘  
A ‗comparison‘ to a mystery rival is just puffery; it is not falsifiable and therefore is not 
informative.‖ (quoting 16 C.F.R. 14.15(b) (1995))). 
13  See, e.g., Letter from Gary Ruskin, Executive Director, Commercial Alert, to Do-
nald Clark, Secretary, Fed. Trade Comm‘n (Sept. 30, 2003), available at 
http://commercialalert.org/ftc.pdf. 
14  See Zahr Said Stauffer, Embedded Advertising and the Venture Consumer, 89 N.C. 
L. REV. 99, 106 (2010) (arguing that the modern ―venture consumer‖ ―has a sophisticated 
and perhaps even cynical view of the relationship between content producers and adver-
tisers.  The venture consumer has less need for, and—one might speculate—
comparatively less interest in, what sponsorship disclosure law can offer‖). 
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have the classic problem of the ―market for lemons.‖15  In the ab-
sence of external verification, the consumer has to assume that 
everybody is lying and discount everybody‘s information, includ-
ing that from actually independent sources.
16 
 We need ways of 
sorting and evaluating the credibility of sources, but to the extent 
that a marketer can pretend to be someone else, many of those 
ways lose their force as well. 
Some people suggest that consumers will eventually figure out 
who to trust, once consumers get used to the internet.
17
  But media 
are always in transition, and people have not gotten demonstrably 
better at figuring out credibility without help from an external reg-
ulator.  It has now been over sixteen years since the enactment of 
the Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act (―DSHEA‖), 
and the FDA has extremely compelling evidence that consumers 
do not understand that supplement claims are essentially unregu-
lated by the FDA.
18
 
Does a reasonable consumer expect that weknowdiets.com, ―a 
comprehensive database of information for people who are looking 
                                                 
15  See George A. Akerlof, The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Mar-
ket Mechanism, in EXPLORATIONS IN PRAGMATIC ECONOMICS: SELECTED PAPERS OF 
GEORGE A. AKERLOF ET AL. 27, 33–34 (2005); Rebecca Tushnet, Attention Must Be Paid: 
Commercial Speech, User-Generated Ads, and the Challenge of Regulation, 58 BUFF. L. 
REV. 721, 751 (2010). 
16  This is related to the problem of heterogeneity, which is that we do not have the ga-
tekeepers we once had; almost anyone can post a review on Amazon.  If, say, ten of every 
comment or apparently informative article you read are actually sponsored by someone 
with a financial interest, you would not know which ten.  So your discounting will inevit-
ably be over inclusive—you will overly discount reviews that are actually independent 
and, if you are truly applying an average discount, you will also insufficiently discount 
those reviews that actually do come from a self-interested party.  That‘s inefficiency. See 
Tushnet, Attention Must be Paid, supra note 15, at 759–60.  By contrast, a labeling rule 
telling you who sponsored what would allow differential discounting.  There are efficien-
cy costs to labeling as well, so I don‘t want to contend that efficiency alone, absent nor-
mative considerations, provides an obvious answer.   
17  See Said Stauffer, supra note 14, at 168 (―The venture consumer, unlike the novice 
researcher once tempted to rely on information merely because it existed online, has 
learned to interrogate her sources.  If she has not yet learned this lesson, she must.‖). 
18  See Karen Russo France & Paula Fitzgerald Bone, Policy Makers’ Paradigms and 
Evidence from Consumer Interpretations of Dietary Supplement Labels, 
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/05n0413/05n-0413-ts00007-France.pdf (last 
visited Apr. 9, 2011).  
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for a trimmer body and healthier lifestyle,‖ has undisclosed corpo-
rate sponsors and does not make independent recommendations? 
 
 
 
On this site, ―this week‘s Editor‘s Choice Award‖ for several 
months running was MiracleBurn®, which actually owned and op-
erated this site.  The Federal Trade Commission and the National 
Advertising Division of the Better Business Bureau both look with 
disfavor on these types of ―astroturfing,‖ because they pollute the 
information environment and mislead consumers to think that such 
sites are as reliable as those offered by truly independent review-
ers.
19 
 I think the FTC and the NAD are right about how consumers 
                                                 
19  See, e.g., Legacy Learning Sys., Inc., No. 102-3055, 2011 WL 1055393 (F.T.C. 
Mar. 15, 2011) (enjoining use of ostensibly ―independent reviews reflecting the opinions 
of ordinary consumers‖ which were, in fact, created by the respondent‘s affiliates to pro-
mote the respondent‘s products and fining respondent $250,000); Stephanie Clifford, No-
tice Those Ads on Blogs? Regulators Do Too, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/11/business/media/11adco.html (discussing the Na-
tional Advertising Review Council‘s investigation of weknowdiets.com).   
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actually do perceive sites like this that do not disclose their spon-
sorship. 
But aside from the descriptive point, I want to ask about the 
normative implications of positing that consumers expect undis-
closed sponsorship.  It would be a bad idea for us to live in a world 
where consumers expect that all mentions of a trademark are au-
thorized, and we should push the law in the direction of preventing 
any such totalizing ownership claims.  If the law were to take the 
position that a reasonable consumer in the modern ad-saturated 
economy must expect an association between a trademark owner 
and a depiction of the trademarked good or service (unless perhaps 
the depiction is relentlessly negative), then trademark owners‘ con-
trol would expand unacceptably. 
Consider product reviews.  If the law were to take the position 
that reasonable consumers expect that there are lots of undisclosed 
connections between trademark owners and people who talk about 
trademarked goods and services, then trademark owners will be 
able to argue actionable confusion among a substantial percentage 
of reasonable consumers when reviews are not to their taste.  (It is 
important to remember here that trademark law is willing to find 
actionable confusion when far less than a majority of consumers 
are confused—20% will regularly support an injunction, and plain-
tiffs have succeeded on far weaker showings.)
20
 
There are many plausible scenarios in which a rational trade-
mark owner would object to a review, even one that wasn‘t a vi-
cious attack.  Examples include positive but profane reviews, racist 
reviews, otherwise untoward reviews, mixed reviews, or reviews 
appearing alongside content which the trademark owner does not 
approve.  Stealth marketers are, in fact, often accused of allowing 
supposedly skeptical reviews to appear alongside the positive ones 
                                                 
20  See, e.g., R.J.R. Foods, Inc. v. White Rock Corp., 603 F.2d 1058 (2d Cir. 1979) 
(upholding trial court‘s finding of a trade dress infringement based in part on ―the results 
of a consumer study showing a fifteen to twenty percent rate of product confusion‖); 
James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266 (7th Cir. 1976) (holding 
that a 15% rate of consumer confusion was sufficient to support of finding of trademark 
infringement). 
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to make the overall site seem credible and to make the positive re-
views seem just a little bit smarter in comparison.
21
 
Thus, in a world where labeling of sponsorship is not the de-
fault, a reasonable consumer might even think that a trademark 
owner was behind a negative review—at least, the trademark own-
er would have every incentive to make this claim when threatening 
publishers of negative reviews.  And, although Section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act is designed to decrease self-
censorship by immunizing online service providers from most torts 
committed by user-provided content, Section 230 explicitly ex-
cludes intellectual property violations from its coverage.
22 
 Thus, if 
what were defamation claims against a bad review became trade-
mark claims, service providers would be pushed in the direction of 
automatically taking down challenged reviews to avoid secondary 
liability for distributing those reviews. 
Similar problems of distorting belief arise with situations such 
as appearances in expressive works, where trademark owners may 
pay for less-than-perfect portrayals.  On 30 Rock, Tina Fey mocked 
General Electric‘s sponsorship while receiving it, following in the 
footsteps of Wayne and Garth of the movie Wayne’s World.23  
Sponsorship by the trademark owner is filling a place that we 
might once have thought reserved for parody, which we would 
have expected twenty years ago to actually be unauthorized.  To 
take another example, 7-11 ran a promotion briefly rebranding it-
self as the Quik-E-Mart, which began as a parody of 7-11 in The 
Simpsons.
24
  Mattel licensed the song Barbie Girl for use in its 
commercials
25 
after unsuccessfully suing the record label for 
                                                 
21  See Osterhout, supra note 8.   
22  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (―No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall 
be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information 
content provider.‖); id. § 230(e)(2) (―Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or 
expand any law pertaining to intellectual property.‖). 
23   See Sonia Katyal, Stealth Marketing and Antibranding: The Love that Dare Not 
Speak Its Name, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 795, 795 (2010). 
24 See SIMPSONS MOVIE KWIK-E-MART THEMED 7-11‘S MIRROR, 7-ELEVEN, 
http://simpsonskwikemart.blogspot.com (tracking the stores that had been transformed to 
promote the Simpsons movie) (last visited Apr. 9, 2011). 
25 See The Barbie® Official Music Video 2009, http://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=hwu6NrxVVFk&feature=player_embedded (last visited Apr. 9, 2011). 
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trademark infringement and losing the case because the song was a 
successful commentary on Barbie‘s plastic values.26 
The problem goes deeper than entertainment promoted as such: 
some ―real‖ news is fake.  The ―video news release‖ is a notorious 
example of advertiser-generated content presented to seem inde-
pendent.
27 
 The most sophisticated versions include space for a lo-
cal broadcaster to put in questions from its reporters to make it 
look as if the station reported the story.
28
  If the savvy consumer 
believes that undisclosed sponsors lurk on every screen, then she 
could be confused about the source or sponsorship of actually in-
dependent productions. 
Consider also rivalry figurines, which show one sports team‘s 
heroic mascot dominating a rival‘s pathetic mascot.29  These are 
licensed by both teams, though the pathetic team gets a smaller 
share of the revenues. 
 
 
 
                                                 
26  See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 907 (9th Cir. 2002). 
27  See Ellen P. Goodman, Stealth Marketing and Editorial Integrity, 85 TEX. L. REV. 
83, 90–91 (2006); Jeffrey Peabody, Note, When the Flock Ignores the Shepherd—
Corralling the Undisclosed Use of Video News Releases, 60 FED. COMM. L.J. 577 (2008).  
28  See David Barstow, Report Faults Video Reports Shown as News, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
6, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/06/business/media/06video.html?scp=10& 
sq=video%20news%20releases&st=cse. 
29  See Bruce P. Keller & Rebecca Tushnet, Even More Parodic than the Real Thing: 
Parody Lawsuits Revisited, 94 TRADEMARK REP. 979, 1000–01 (2004). 
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If we took the existence of a licensing market for parodies as 
evidence that trademark owners were legitimately entitled to con-
trol such markets, because consumers expected that control, we 
would cut off important avenues of social and political criticism.  
Recall Ralph Nader‘s successful defense against MasterCard when 
one of Nader‘s political ads spoofed the ―Priceless‖ ad campaign 
and slogan by arguing that other politicians were for sale.
30 
 When 
Stephen Colbert ―runs‖ for president in a campaign that actually 
appears to be sponsored by Doritos,
31 
and when the Supreme Court 
has endorsed unlimited corporate spending on campaigns,
32
 how 
are consumers to know where the line is to be drawn?  Skepticism, 
supposedly a way for consumers to protect themselves according 
to the anti-disclosure account, can therefore lay the ground for con-
fusion of another kind.  In a low-trust world, we misunderstand the 
signals from the truly reliable and independent. 
Trademark now faces the same problem copyright did in the 
past few decades: the emergence of owners who largely do not 
care about good reputation, but are satisfied just to get paid.
33 
 This 
is the Paris Hilton model of licensing, where there is no such thing 
as bad publicity.
34
  Copyright dealt with this by declaring certain 
markets off-limits to copyright owners‘ exclusive control despite 
their empirical willingness to license in those markets, because of 
society‘s greater need for freedom of commentary, parody, and 
                                                 
30  See MasterCard Int‘l, Inc. v. Nader 2000 Primary Comm., Inc., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
31  See Stephen Colbert Is Running—And Not Everyone‘s Laughing, NYTimes.com 
(Oct. 24, 2007, 4:16 PM), http://theboard.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/10/24/stephen-colbert-
is-running-and-not-everyones-laughing. 
32   See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm‘n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
33 See The Donald as Dean?, SMOKING GUN (Aug. 26, 2004) 
http://www.thesmokinggun.com/documents/crime/donald-dean (showing celebrity Do-
nald Trump‘s application to trademark ―Trump University‖); TRUMP STEAKS, 
http://www.trumpsteaks.com (last visited Apr. 11, 2011); TRUMP VODKA, 
http://www.trumptini.com (last visited Apr. 11, 2011); see also Donald Trump’s Most 
Ridiculous Business Venture, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 20, 2010, 3:50 PM) 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/08/19/trump-usa-donalds-most-
pr_n_687873.html#s128219&title=Trump_Teas. 
34  See Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 580 F.3d 874 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that Hilton had 
a valid claim against a greeting card that seemed to make fun of her participation in a re-
ality show). 
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analysis.
35
  Trademark needs to do this too, despite the official sto-
ries we tell about how trademark rights are generally defined by 
consumer perception.
36
 
First Amendment doctrine could do something for us here.  In 
First Amendment law, we are used to accepting statements about 
audiences that we know are not true.  These statements sound as if 
they are descriptive, but they are in fact normative statements.
37
  In 
part because we think the regulatory alternative is too dangerous, 
audiences for political speech must be treated as if they are able to 
make careful distinctions and judgments and weigh evidence for 
themselves, even when the speech at issue is probably mislead-
ing.
38
  We are thus committed to a particular definition of the ―rea-
sonable citizen,‖ regardless of how competent real citizens are or 
are not. 
                                                 
35  See, e.g., Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 614–15 
(2d Cir. 2006) (―[A] copyright holder cannot prevent others from entering fair use mar-
kets merely ‗by developing or licensing a market for parody, news reporting, educational 
or other transformative uses of its own creative work.‘‖ (quoting Castle Rock Entm‘t, Inc. 
v. Carol Publ‘g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 146 n.11 (2d Cir. 1998)); Twin Peaks Prods. v. 
Publ‘ns Int‘l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1377 (2d Cir. 1993) (―A copyright holder‘s protection 
of its market for derivative works of course cannot enable it to bar publication of works 
of comment, criticism, or news reporting whose commercial success is enhanced by the 
wide appeal of the copyrighted work.‖). 
36  See Graeme W. Austin, Tolerating Confusion About Confusion: Trademark Policies 
and Fair Use, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 157, 175 (2008) (―[A]s a legal policy matter, equating 
trademark rights with what consumers might become confused about cannot be sufficient.  
Trademark rights need to be shaped by other legal principles, values, and agendas.‖); Re-
becca Tushnet, Running the Gamut from A to B: Federal Trademark and False Advertis-
ing Law, 159 U. PENN. L. REV. 1305 (2011) (arguing for greater normative limits on 
trademark‘s scope, and arguing that current doctrines of nominative and descriptive fair 
use are best understood as setting such limits).  
37  See, e.g., Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Thomas F. Cotter, Authorship, Audiences, and 
Anonymous Speech, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1537, 1586 (2007) (―The presumption that 
audiences will respond rationally to speech is integrally related to a second fundamental 
presumption in First Amendment jurisprudence, namely, that truth is best gathered ‗out of 
a multitude of tongues.‘‖) (citation omitted); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copy-
right Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 34 (2001) (―First Amend-
ment jurisprudence posits that government officials should treat citizens as fundamentally 
rational, autonomous agents, capable of weighing the value and probity of speech for 
themselves.‖); James Weinstein, Speech Categorization and the Limits of First Amend-
ment Formalism: Lessons From Nike v. Kasky, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1091, 1137 
n.157 (2004) (discussing ―the core democratic precept that the government must treat lis-
teners in their citizenship capacity as rational agents‖). 
38  See supra note 37 and sources cited therein.   
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Similarly, there is good reason to commit to a normative view 
of the ―reasonable consumer‖ who does not need to expect undis-
closed control, or even undisclosed ties, between a trademark own-
er and a person referencing, reviewing, parodying, or otherwise 
engaging with a trademark.  The fact that product placement and 
unbranding are pervasive in some sectors of the economy should 
therefore be legally irrelevant to claims of likely confusion over 
unauthorized uses, even if those unauthorized uses look like prod-
uct placement. 
This principle can be reconceptualized as a matter of fairness: 
if a trademark owner gives up apparent control, it should not be al-
lowed to claim a right to exercise real control over other people 
with whom it never actually contracted, even if those people are 
doing things that look like what the trademark owner (surrepti-
tiously) authorized.  In other words, even if trademark owners are 
covering the ground with ―astroturf,‖ they should not be able the-
reby to control the real grassroots.  Otherwise, when it comes to 
fooling consumers, trademark owners are in a ―heads I win, tails 
you lose‖ position: able to disguise their involvement with appar-
ently independent speakers and then rein in actual independent 
voices. 
 
